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Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural Soils 
 
Elizabeth A. Wilman 
 
Although it is common to alternate between till and no-till practices, past research has 
considered farmers’ tillage options to be limited to the dichotomous choice of whether or 
not to switch to a long-term no-till regime. This paper expands farmers’ options and 
models their choices of tillage frequency. Less frequent tilling sequesters more carbon 
but permits a greater accumulation of weeds, whereas more frequent tilling eliminates 
weeds but releases carbon (tillage emissions). The timing of tillage balances its marginal 
benefits and costs. Higher payments from industry or government for atmospheric 
greenhouse gas reductions will increase marginal cost and reduce tillage frequency. Other 
key parameters, such as higher rates of tillage emissions or reduced weed impact, also 
influence tillage frequency. However, for the discount rate and the natural decay rate of 
carbon, the net change depends on the magnitude of other parameters. 
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Introduction 
 
Carbon sequestration in agricultural soils can reduce atmospheric greenhouse gases; sequestra- 
tion rates are impacted by farmers’ tillage practices. Changing from conventional tillage to no 
tillage increases sequestration of soil carbon. In addition, longer no-tillage periods lead to 
larger amounts of sequestered carbon. However, because tillage is beneficial for weed control 
and other reasons, no-till practices are occasionally or frequently interrupted, resulting in a 
pattern of tillage within a no-till regime. While earlier studies have been conducted on whether 
or not to adopt a particular long-term sequestration program such as no-till, and some have 
considered switching out of the program, none have examined multiple tillage options. This 
paper presents a model that allows for different tillage frequencies, and shows that payments 
for reducing atmospheric greenhouse gases can increase sequestration by decreasing tillage 
frequency, even if such payments do not provide a sufficiently strong incentive for complete 
no-till adoption. 
 
Costs and Benefits of Less Frequent Tillage 
 
Farmers’ tillage decisions are driven by the costs and benefits of postponing tillage. Agri-
cultural tillage controls weeds, relieves soil compaction, incorporates surface residue and 
fertilizers, and prepares the soil surface for seeding (Phillips et al., 1980). One of the most 
important reasons for tilling is to eliminate weeds, which allows for higher commercial yields 
(Hobbs, Sayre, and Gupta, 2008). Hill (2001) finds that U.S. Corn Belt growers tilled at least 
every two and a half years to avoid decreased yields. No-till practices promote both the build-
up of soil carbon and weed growth. While annual tilling may not be necessary for controlling 
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weeds, periodic tilling often is. In the Northern Great Plains, weeds such as foxtail barley can 
be difficult pests in a no-till system, and keeping them in check may require periodic tilling 
(Derksen et al., 2002). 
  Less frequent tilling promotes the sequestration of carbon in agricultural soils, leading to 
improved soil organic carbon (SOC) and subsequently promoting soil fertility and enhancing 
yields. Farmers will therefore pursue some carbon sequestration practices for the private 
benefits they receive. Tillage affects SOC accumulation through its influence on soil carbon 
dynamics, which can be characterized at the most basic level by two carbon pools—a surface 
labile pool, and a deeper stable pool. Carbon residue inputs initially enter the surface pool 
where the tillage regime influences their capture and retention. With no-tillage practices, the 
residue is protected and forms SOC, which is transferred to the deeper pool and sequestered 
over an extended period of time. Tillage interrupts the stabilization of SOC in the surface pool 
and releases carbon to the atmosphere (Six, Elliot, and Paustian, 2000). As reported by Conant 
et al. (2007), frequent tilling of agricultural soils results in less retained carbon. Campbell et 
al. (1995) show that in the brown chernozem soils of the Canadian prairies, a reversion back 
to conventional tillage after no-till led to a statistically significant decline in SOC in the 
surface pool and a resulting smaller input into the slowly decaying deeper soil pool. 
  The same practices that improve SOC also reduce atmospheric CO2, but it appears the 
potential soil carbon sink provided by agricultural soils is not large relative to emissions. 
Sperow, Eve, and Paustian (2003) estimate the potential sink in the United States to be about 
15% of the reduction required by the Kyoto Protocol from 2008 emission levels. Desjardins et 
al. (2001) estimate Canada’s potential sink to be 7% of the required reduction from 2010 
emissions. However, there is evidence that increasing the duration of no-till practices also 
increases the potential amount of stored carbon (Manley et al., 2005). Focusing specifically 
on periodic tillage, Conant et al. (2007) find that the duration of no-tillage practices has a 
substantial impact on carbon sequestration. Although the potential sink is currently estimated 
to be small, tillage frequency can have considerable influence on its size, and agricultural 
sinks could therefore play an important role in mitigating greenhouse gases. 
  Despite being a social benefit, reducing atmospheric CO2 is not a private benefit for 
farmers. However, this externality could be internalized though the creation of offsets that 
might be rented or purchased by the government or by private-sector emitters whose emissions 
are regulated. Since less frequent tillage sequesters more carbon, payments for offsets could 
create incentives for less frequent tillage. 
 
Carbon Contracts 
Recent studies on carbon sequestration contract design focus on long-term contracts for one 
specific, though vaguely defined, sequestration technology. Feng, Zhao, and Kling (2002) 
present a model in which agricultural land can be brought into, or removed from, a carbon 
sequestration program. Because the least expensive land is brought into the program first, the 
marginal cost of bringing new land into the program (or the marginal benefit from removing 
it) increases as more land is introduced into the program. 
  Gulati and Vercammen (2005) model the optimal long-term contract length, which is deter- 
mined by a rising marginal opportunity cost through time and a declining marginal benefit 
from sequestration. Marginal costs rise over time because the build-up of soil carbon raises 
productivity and increases farmers’ profits, regardless of whether the sequestration program is 
continued. Declining marginal benefits result from saturation, which limits further carbon Wilman Carbon  Sequestration  in Agricultural Soils   123 
 
accumulation. Using a similar model, Gulati and Vercammen (2006) consider problems of 
time inconsistency when a contract to use carbon sequestering technology is of limited 
duration, and payments within the contract are discounted to reflect the fact that carbon can 
be released without liability at the contract’s end. Antle et al. (2003) compare the costs of 
sequestering a precise amount of carbon under contracts that pay farmers for a specific 
technology versus tons of sequestered carbon. They conclude that the inefficiency associated 
with requiring a specific technology far outweighs measurement costs associated with per ton 
payments. 
  This study extends the earlier work of Gulati and Vercammen (2005) in that the growth of 
a stock of weeds is a by-product of the build-up of soil carbon, but the timing of a tillage 
event does not determine optimal contract length. Additionally, we provide for a wider menu 
of tillage patterns. Also, similar to Antle et al. (2003), we allow farmers to choose tillage 
patterns. In our model, however, offset payments provide an incentive for less frequent tilling, 
but do not necessarily lead to long-term no-till practices. We also allow for investments in 
seeding and weed control technologies to reduce the cost of delaying tillage, making our 
policy recommendations richer than those from earlier models. 
 
Options for Soil Carbon Sequestration 
The Model 
 
We assume farmers operate in a perfectly competitive market for their agricultural product 
and their tillage choices are based on private costs and benefits. These include the benefit of 
increasing crop yields resulting from increased SOC, the cost of decreasing crop yields through 
the build-up of weed infestations, and the offset revenue generated or lost by sequestering 
atmospheric CO2 or releasing it into the atmosphere through tillage. The model is nested in 
that offset payments vary from zero to the full marginal social value of reducing atmospheric 
CO2. The optimal control model incorporates delayed weed and carbon stock responses, and 
is similar to delayed recruitment models in fisheries economics (Clark, 1976) and lagged 
entry models of limit pricing (De Bondt, 1976; Kamien and Schwartz, 1981). 
  Farmers face a dynamic optimization problem. The objective is to maximize the present 
value of a flow of net benefits into the infinite future, subject to the limits imposed by the 
dynamics of soil carbon sequestration and weed accumulation, and on the amount of land 
available. The maximization objective is converted to a Hamiltonian composed of two parts. 
The first is instantaneous net benefits and the second is the marginal value of investments or 
disinvestments in the stocks of soil carbon and weeds. Instantaneous net benefits include the 
crop yield benefits in equation (1) and the benefits from the rental of offsets in equation (2): 
(1)  () tt t PAY PA cC dW   
and 
(2)  () , to CC   
where P is the fixed net price per unit of commercial crop yield; Yt = cCt − dWt is the crop 
yield per hectare, which is a linear function of soil carbon and weed stocks and does not vary 
across time; c is the constant marginal product of the soil carbon stock; Ct is the soil carbon 
stock at time t; Co is the baseline carbon stock with continuous tillage; −d is the constant 
marginal product of the weed stock; Wt is the weed stock at time t; A is the hectares of land 124   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
under crop at time t; and π is the offset rental rate for a unit of carbon stock above the base-
line kept out of the atmosphere. No-till practices promote increases in both weed and soil 
carbon stocks. Incremental additions to soil carbon stock have positive and constant marginal 
effects on crop yields, while incremental additions to weed stock have negative and constant 
marginal effects on crop yields. 
  The second part of the Hamiltonian is the marginal value of investments or disinvestments 
in the two stocks—weeds and soil carbon. Both stocks must be nonnegative; the shadow 
prices of these stocks are αt and λt. There are four tillage control variables: vt, wt, xt, and yt. 
The variable vt represents hectares tilled in time t after being last tilled in t
 −
 1, implying 
continuous tillage. The variables wt, xt, and yt represent periodic tillage—hectares tilled in t 
after being last tilled in t
 –
 2, t
 –
 3, and t
 –
 4. After each tillage event, land must be recommitted 
to no-till. The variable ut represents hectares of land recommitted in time t. The recommitted 
land may be tilled again at time t
 +
 1, t
 +
 2, t
 +
 3, or t
 +
 4, or left in permanent no-till. 
 
Weed Stock 
 
Weed stock at time t, Wt, has a negative influence on yield. Smith et al. (1996) show that no-
till practices can lead to a build-up of weed stock, particularly for perennial weeds. Suppose 
that in year zero, a farmer chooses uo, the number of hectares to be permanently committed to 
a tillage rotation, and weeds do not accumulate during year zero. In the next year, s1 units of 
weeds per hectare accumulate, as do additional units in the subsequent three years, s2, s3, and 
s4. The marginal accumulation is positive but decreasing through time: s1 > s2 > s3 > s4 > 0. 
The total amounts accumulated per hectare after one, two, three, and four years are S1 = s1, 
S2 = s1
 +
 s2, S3 = s1
 +
 s2
 +
 s3, and S4 = s1
 +
 s2
 +
 s3
 +
 s4. To simplify, we assume there is no addi- 
tional weed accumulation after year four. 
  When there are tillage options, the net increment to the weed stock between years t and 
t
 +
 1 will be influenced by the hectares committed to a tillage rotation in the past and not tilled 
before t
 +
 1. Land committed to no-till in t
 −
 4, and not tilled in t
 −
 3, t
 −
 2, t
 −
 1, or t, will 
contribute an increment of s4nt−4 = s4(ut−4 − vt−3 − wt−2 − xt−1 – yt). Land committed in t
 −
 3 
and not tilled in t
 −
 2,  t
 −
 1, or t will contribute an increment of s3nt−3 = s3(ut−3 − vt−2 − 
wt−1 − xt). Similar contributions will come from land committed in years t
 −
 2 and t
 –
 1. If tillage 
occurs in time t, not only will the marginal increment to the weed stock be avoided, but any 
previously accumulated weed stock will be eliminated. The change in the stock Wt is given by: 
(3) 
4
11 2 3
1
. tt i t i t t t
i
W W s n Sw Sx Sy 

      
 
The Soil Carbon Stock 
 
Soil carbon stocks are affected by crop residue inputs and decay processes. Even the simplest 
soil science models have complicated carbon dynamics, involving many different carbon 
pools that decay at different rates. Our approach is to simplify these models and consider two 
pools: a labile pool and a more slowly decaying pool. To keep our model tractable, we combine 
the two pools into one carbon stock, which receives inputs and exhibits two types of carbon 
releases from short-term decay processes induced by tillage and long-term natural decay 
processes.  Wilman Carbon  Sequestration  in Agricultural Soils   125 
 
  Gross crop residue inputs are treated as identical regardless of tillage system. Short-term 
decay processes are computed by subtracting tillage releases from residue inputs. Tillage 
emissions depend on organic matter stocks near the surface (roughly the top 15 centimeters) 
and previous management practices (Campbell et al., 1995). A tillage event following a period 
of no-till practices would release a somewhat greater amount of carbon than a regularly 
occurring tillage event. However, Conant et al. (2007) find that steady-state soil carbon 
content is greater in less frequently tilled soils. Over a number of years, total tillage emissions 
will be smaller for fewer tillage events, because carbon inputs in the near-surface labile pool 
gradually move to pools that are less prone to release (Six, Elliot, and Paustian, 2000).
1 Given 
carbon inputs in every time period, this gradual movement means that longer periods of no-
till practices increase emissions from a subsequent tillage event, but incremental emissions 
from an increase in tillage rotation will decrease with longer tillage rotations. 
  All cropland is assumed to provide g tons of carbon input per hectare to the residue pool 
per year and is assumed to have been under continuous tillage prior to conversion to no-till. 
We also assume land tilled in time t
 −
 1 can be committed to no-till at the end of that time 
period. However, soil carbon inputs are not increased until time t. For a unit of crop residue 
input deposited in time t, a portion (f) of the input will remain in the labile pool until the end 
of the time period. While it is in the labile pool, it can be released by tillage. The remaining 
portion (1
 – f
 ) enters the more stable pool and will be released slowly at a decay rate of k. 
Annual net carbon input on continuously tilled land is g(1
 – f ) per hectare. 
  If a hectare of land is committed in time t
 −
 1 and never again tilled, none of the carbon 
added to the labile pool is ever released by tillage, and the net carbon input will include both 
the labile and stable pool inputs. The net input at time t will be g and will remain at that level 
indefinitely; the soil carbon stock decays slowly at a rate of k. 
  If land was converted to no-till at the end of time t
 −
 2, not tilled in t
 –
 1, and then tilled in 
time t, tillage emissions will be generated from time t (gf
 ) and time t
 −
 1. Although natural 
decay processes occur, most carbon, (1
 − k)gf, remains in the soil and is carried forward to 
time t. Like new input, the carry-forward input is divided into two portions: (1
 − k)gf
 (1
 – f ) 
enters the more stable pool and (1
 − k)gf
 2 remains in the labile pool and is released by tillage 
in time t. The total tillage release per hectare in time t is gf + (1
 − k)gf
 2. Letting F = (1
 − k)f, 
the total tillage loss in t is gf + gfF and the net carbon input is g(1
 – f ) – gfF. With tilling 
every second year, tillage emissions in a tillage year exceed the annual continuous tillage 
losses, gf + gfF > gf; but over two years, tillage losses are greater under continuous tillage, 
2gf > gf + gfF. 
  If land is committed at the end of time t
 −
 3 and tilling does not occur until time t, tillage 
emissions per hectare in t will be gf + gf(F + F
2), and the net carbon input will be g(1
 – f
 ) – 
gf(F + F
2). These emissions exceed those from tilling every second year and the annual 
emissions from continuous tillage, gf + gf(F + F
2) > gf + gfF > gf. Over six years, how-
ever, its emissions are less than those from tilling every second year, and both are less than 
those from continuous tillage.
2 For land converted at the end of time t
 –
 4, the net input in 
time t is written as: 
 
3
1
(1 ) .
i
t
g fg f F

    
                                                 
1 Soil science models typically recognize multiple pools. For a relatively simple (two-pool) model, see the ICBM Model 
(Andrén and Kätterer, 1997). For a more complex example, see the Century Model (Parton et al., 1987). 
2 Over six years, the total emissions from tillage every third year versus every second year versus every year are: 2gf + 
2gfF +  2gfF
2
 <  3gf +  3gfF <  6gf. 126   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
For land converted at t
 −
 5 or earlier, the net input is assumed to remain the same as for land 
converted at t
 −
 4. Incorporating net carbon inputs and natural emissions, the soil carbon 
dynamics are given by: 
(4) 
2
1
1
(1 ) ( ) tt t i t t
i
CC gf A g f ng f F w g f F F x



        
  
23 () . tt g fF F F y k C    
This description of soil carbon dynamics is simpler than most soil science models. However, 
it can be parameterized to give results very similar to models such as those presented in 
Campbell et al. (1995); McConkey, Liang, and Campbell (1999); and Conant et al. (2007).
3 
  Figure 1 shows the time paths for soil carbon stocks under various tillage rotations, with 
parameters that mimic results in the literature for Great Plains soil carbon dynamics.
4 The 
initial stock (Co) is the unique steady state for continuous tillage. With tilling occurring every 
second year, the soil carbon stock increases prior to a decline resulting from a tillage event. 
The decline offsets a portion of the increase. With longer tillage rotations, the stock increases 
by a greater amount prior to a somewhat greater decline. The decline offsets a smaller portion 
of the increase. Thus, longer tillage rotations build up the stock more quickly and to a higher 
steady-state level. With periodic tilling, the steady state is cyclical. The stock increases and 
then slips back by an equal amount upon tillage. The amplitude of the cycle is greater for 
longer tillage rotations, but the average stock level is also higher. Permanent no-till generates 
a continuous increase in the soil carbon stock until reaching a unique steady state. 
 
The Farmer’s Hamiltonian 
 
The full Hamiltonian contains the instantaneous net benefits, plus the marginal value of 
investments/disinvestments in the stocks. The constraint vt + wt + xt + yt – ut = 0 indicates that 
the amount of land recommitted to no-till in time t must be equal to the amount of land tilled 
in that time period; β is the shadow price on this constraint. With r as the discount rate and 
ρ = 1/(1
 + r) as the discount factor, the Hamiltonian is specified as: 
(5)  

4
11 2 3
1
22 3
11
1
() ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( )
t t t ot i t ittt
i
tt i t t t t
i
HP A c Cd W CC s n S wS xS y
g fA f n g fF w F F x F F F y



 


          


          



 
  1 () . tt t t t t t kC v w x y u          
                                                 
3 An appendix with a schematic of the soil carbon dynamics is available from the author upon request. 
4 The parameter value for the simulation in figure 1 was chosen to produce very rough equivalence to the results of a tillage 
experiment on brown chernozem soils in Saskatchewan (Campbell et al., 1995). In this experiment, the initial state was land 
continuously tilled for 70–80 years, with a starting stock of soil carbon at 30 metric tons per hectare. With this starting stock, a 
residue input g= 2 metric tons, f = 0.24, and k = 0.05, continuous tillage maintains the steady state of 30 metric tons. Permanent no-
tillage increases the carbon stock by about 4 metric tons over 10 years. The steady state with continuous no-till is 40 metric tons. 
Although this is approached only asymptotically, 39 metric tons are achieved in 46 years. Campbell et al. have no steady-state 
estimate. However, they suggest estimates of 30 to 50 years to reach steady state. They also introduce tillage in one experiment 
after a 10–12 year period of no-till. Our rotational tillage simulations yield similar reductions in soil carbon to their experiment. By 
way of comparison, Conant et al. (2007) use the Century model to simulate soil carbon content for a site near Manhattan, Kansas. 
The conventional tillage steady state was 31.6 metric tons, and the no-till steady state was 40.2. Tillage every two years produced a 
steady state of 34.6 metric tons, and every four years of 36.9 metric tons. Wilman Carbon  Sequestration  in Agricultural Soils   127 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Soil carbon to 100 years after a continuous tillage steady state 
 
The first-order conditions include four tillage rotation conditions, the no-till commitment con-
dition, and the adjoint equations for stocks Ct and Wt, which are represented as: 
(6)  11 tt t PcA k             
and 
(7)  1 . tt PdA     
  Unless continuous tilling or permanent no-till is chosen as an option, both the soil carbon 
and weed stock will exhibit cyclical steady-state behavior. However, their shadow prices, 
  and ,
11 ( 1 )
PdA PcA
k
 
 
  
 
are unique steady-state values because of the linearity of the crop yield function. The value of 
α is the marginal cost of an extra unit of weed stock, while λ is the marginal value of an extra 
unit of soil carbon sequestration considering both its soil enhancement value and its value for 
reducing atmospheric carbon. PcA + π is the annual marginal benefit per unit of carbon 
sequestered, and 
 
()
1( 1)
PcA
k
 

 
 
is the marginal present value of benefits from that unit. The latter discounts future sequestra-
tion benefits from a unit of sequestered carbon that decays at rate k. 
  We now use the steady-state levels for λ and α in the first-order conditions for tillage 
decisions and for the decision to commit (or recommit) to no-till:   
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(8)   
4
1
0,
1
(, 0 ) ;
i
i
i
tt
gf
s
vA v


   


  
(9)   
3
11
1
0,
1
(, 0 ) ;
i
i
i
tt
gf
sS g f F
wA w



     


  
(10)    
2
2
22
1
()0 ,
1
(, 0 ) ;
i
i
i
tt
gf
sS g f F F
xA x



      


  
(11)    
1
23
33
1
() 0 ,
1
(, 0 ) ;
i
i
i
tt
gf
sS g f F F F
yA y



       


  
(12)    
2 4
1
1
0,
1
(, 0 ) .
i
i
i
tt
gf
s
uA u



     


  
Because the Hamiltonian is linear in the control variables and α and λ are constants, ut, vt, 
wt, xt, and yt are either zero or A; β is the marginal value of the constraint which requires that 
the amount of land recommitted to no-till following tillage equals the amount of land just 
tilled. When land is tilled, it becomes available for recommitment to no-till. Here, β can be 
viewed as the price per hectare that would be offered for the newly tilled land to be used in 
no-till. For the tillage decision, β is the marginal benefit of making the land available. For the 
recommitment decision, it is the offer price to be paid for land.
5 Condition (8) gives a 
necessary condition for the tilling of A hectares one year after commitment to no-till. The sum 
of the marginal weed reduction benefits from tilling and the marginal benefit of making the 
land available must be at least as great as the value of marginal soil carbon losses. Conditions 
(9)–(11) have similar interpretations, except that they refer to tilling two, three, and four 
years after land has been committed to no-till. 
  Because the choice of tillage rotation allows at most one of vt, wt, xt, or yt to equal A, the 
necessary condition for tillage is not sufficient. The determination of the optimal tillage rota-
tion is similar to the determination of the optimal harvest age in forestry (Heaps and Neher, 
1979). Soil carbon and weed stocks are both forms of capital in which a farmer must jointly 
invest or disinvest. Whenever there is an option to till, a farmer must decide whether to 
continue investing in the soil carbon and weed stocks through delaying tillage, or to disinvest 
by tilling. Tilling occurs when marginal net benefits have increased to zero. Although λ and α 
are constant, both weed stocks and emissions per tillage event increase at a declining rate. As 
a result, both the marginal benefits and costs of tilling increase at a decreasing rate. 
  With the additional assumption that weed stocks grow faster than tillage emissions prior to 
t
 – 4, there are three possible outcomes for optimal tillage rotations. First, the sum of marginal 
                                                 
5 The offer price is the same as the concept of bare land value used in forestry—the value of the land for growing future forests 
(see Heaps and Neher, 1979). Wilman Carbon  Sequestration  in Agricultural Soils   129 
 
weed reduction benefits and the marginal benefit of making the land available is always at 
least as great as the marginal soil carbon losses; this implies continuous tillage, or vt = A. 
Second, marginal soil carbon losses always exceed the sum of the two marginal benefits, 
implying vt = wt = xt = yt = 0 and permanent no-till. Third, marginal soil carbon losses initially 
exceed marginal benefits, but the latter grows more quickly and equals or exceeds the former 
by t + 4. Periodic tilling will result with either wt, xt, or yt equal to A. 
  If one of conditions (8)–(11) equals zero, then an optimal tillage rotation exists conditional 
on a previous no-till commitment. Overall optimality requires that both the tillage rotation 
choice and the no-till commitment choice which preceded it be optimal. Condition (12) is the 
no-till commitment condition. It compares the marginal benefits of carbon sequestration with 
the marginal cost of increasing weed stocks plus the offer price for the land. If condition (12) 
holds with equality, it can be combined with the condition for the optimal tillage rotation to 
generate an offer price for land committed to no-till with optimal future tillage. If, for example, 
tilling every second year is conditionally optimal, condition (9) will hold with equality and 
wt = A. Commitment to no-till in time t requires condition (9) to hold with equality in t + 2 
and condition (12) to hold with equality in t. Adjusting condition (9) to t + 2 and substituting 
the result into condition (12) yields: 
(13) 
22 2 3
1 (1 ) (1 ) ( ), Sg fg f F            
where the left-hand side is the offer price for keeping the land in no-till from t to t + 2. The 
first term on the right-hand side is the marginal cost associated with weed stock build-up. The 
second term is the marginal benefit from the net accumulation of carbon stock. The t + 2 
rotation is optimal if marginal net benefit equals the two-period offer price. 
 With  the  t + 2 tillage rotations continuing indefinitely, the land is permanently committed 
and equation (11) can be rewritten as: 
(14) 
22 3
1
2
(1 ) ( )
.
1
Sg fg f F        


 
Equation (14) defines a function which can be used to determine the offer price for land to be 
committed to a tillage rotation of t + 2 indefinitely. Using β (the offer price) as the dependent 
variable, λ (the shadow price for carbon) as the independent variable, and the remaining terms 
as parameters, we have a linear function with a negative intercept, 
 
2
1
2
(1 )
,
1
S   

 
and a positive slope, 
 
23
2 .
1
gfg f F  

 
Using the same approach, β functions like equation (14) can be derived for the periodic tillage 
rotations t + 3 and t + 4. For continuous tillage, conditions (8) and (12) result in β = 0. For the 
permanent no-till condition, (12) alone is used. Table 1 presents the β functions for continuous 
tillage, the three periodic tillage options, and permanent no-till. 
 Each  β function defines the offer price for a given tillage rotation as a function of the 
shadow price for carbon (λ). However, because the tillage rotation which maximizes β (the 130   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
Table 1. Tillage β Functions 
Tillage Description  β Function        
Continuous Tillage 
(t + 1) 
 β = 0 
Periodic Tillage 
(t + 2) 
2 23
1
22 2
(1 )
11 1
S g fg f F      
    
      
 
Periodic Tillage 
(t + 3) 
23 23 4 2
12
33 3 3
(1 ) (1 ) () ()
11 1 1
SS gf gf F F            
     
       
 
Periodic Tillage 
(t + 4) 
23 4
12 3
44 4
234 5 2 3
44
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
11 1
() ( )
11
SS S
gf gf F F F
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       
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Permanent No-Till 
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optimal rotation) varies as the value of λ varies, there is also an envelope β function. The 
envelope function coincides with an individual β function when its tillage rotation is optimal. 
To illustrate, we simulate β functions for individual rotations using the parameters from 
figure 1, supplementing them with parameters relating to weed growth and weed losses. The 
parameters S1 = 5, S2 = 8, S3 = 10, and S4 = 11 describe weed growth. The annual loss from a 
marginal increase in weed stock is set at PAd = 1. With a discount factor of ρ = 0.97, the 
shadow price of a unit of weed stock is α = 34.33. While there is no strong empirical docu-
mentation for these parameter values, they do serve to illustrate how tillage rotations are 
chosen. Using these values, figure 2 shows the offer price (β) as a function of the shadow 
price of carbon (λ) for each of the five β functions in table 1. The optimal tillage rotation is 
found by choosing the maximum β for a given level of λ. Continuous tillage (t + 1) maximizes β 
for λ values of 13.4 or less. A tillage rotation of t + 2 maximizes β for values of λ between 
13.4 and 20.1, a tillage rotation of t + 3 for λ values between 20.1 and 28, and a tillage 
rotation of t + 4 for λ values between 28.1 and 33.2. If the value of λ is above 33.2, permanent 
no-till is the optimal choice. The greater the shadow price of sequestered carbon, the larger 
the maximum offer price and the longer the optimal tillage rotation. 
  Our simplifying assumption of no growth in the weed stock or tillage emission losses 
beyond t + 4 ensures that either t + 4 or permanent no-till always has at least as great a β 
value as any intermediate tillage rotation (the proof is given in the appendix). Relaxing the 
assumption would allow tillage rotations between t + 4 and permanent no-till, but the nature 
of the results would not change.   Wilman Carbon  Sequestration in Agricultural Soils   131 
 
 
Figure 2. Offer price (β) and tillage rotations for different values of λ 
 
 
Internalizing the Benefits from Reducing Atmospheric CO2 
Payments for Atmospheric Carbon Reductions 
The socially optimal tillage rotation is one that fully internalizes the benefits of reducing 
atmospheric CO2 in the offset rental value, π. The shadow price of carbon will incorporate this 
rental value along with the crop yield benefits, giving 
.
1( 1)
PAc
k
 

 
 
In the absence of a regulatory mechanism to internalize these benefits, π = 0 and the shadow 
price of the soil carbon stock will be lower. To illustrate, assume PcA = 1. Without internal-
ization,  π = 0,  λ  =  12.9, and continuous tillage will be chosen (see figure 2). With 
internalization, there must be a positive value for π. Assuming a relatively small value of 
π = 0.165, λ = 15, and the optimal tillage rotation will be t + 2, or wt = A. With higher values 
for π, internalization means higher values for λ and longer optimal tillage rotations. A value 
of  π = 0.797  yields  λ  =  22 and an optimal tillage rotation of t + 3,  or  xt = A. A value of 
π = 1.669 yields λ = 34 and permanent no-till. In general, internalizing the value of reducing 
atmospheric CO2 leads to longer tillage rotations. 
  Potential offset payments could be characterized in at least three ways. So far, we have 
used the annual rental payment of π per ton of stock exceeding the steady-state continuous 
tillage level. The payment per ton of stock is constant, but since the carbon stock changes 
over time, the time path of total rental payments follows the same pattern as the carbon stock 
in figure 1. With permanent no-till, the total rental payment will be constant once the steady-
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state carbon stock has been reached. With periodic tillage, annual payments would be cyclic 
in the steady state, but the total rental payment over the cycle would be constant. 
  Rather than renting the greenhouse gas-reducing services of the accumulated carbon stock, 
a farmer could sell increments of carbon stock and be liable for decrements. For an increment, 
the price is a one-time payment for the stream of services from that increment. Since the 
increment will degrade naturally at a rate k and future benefits are discounted, the present 
value of the services from a one-ton increment in time t will be ρπ/(1
 –
 ρ(1
 –
 k)). A payment 
would be made to the farmer at the time of the initial sequestration, and a liability would 
be created when tillage emissions occur. Table 2 shows a series of payments and liabilities 
based on the ρπ/(1
 –
 ρ(1
 –
 k)) per ton values for different tillage rotations. Continuous tillage 
generates a zero net payment because the payment generated by committing land to no-till 
is exactly offset by the liability resulting from tillage. With a tillage rotation of t + 2, 
1( 1)
gfA
k

 
 
is paid to a farmer for gfA tons added in each of t + 1 and t + 2. But in t + 2, tillage occurs 
and the farmer is liable for 
(1 )
1( 1)
g fA F
k

 
 
to cover the tillage emissions. This leaves a net liability in t + 2 of 
.
1( 1)
gfA F
k

 
 
The other two periodic tillage rotations, t + 3 and t + 4, show a similar pattern of payments 
followed by a liability, while permanent no-till requires the same payment every time period. 
  For intermediate cycles where increments vary, we can collapse the payments and liability 
to one payment per cycle by calculating a discount factor weighted sum of the increments and 
decrements to the carbon stock. For a given tillage rotation, the weighted sum and payment 
would be the same in every cycle. The longer the tillage rotation, the greater the weighted 
sum and payment.
6 Although there is no increase in soil carbon stock once the permanent no-
till steady state has been reached, continued payments are necessary for soil carbon inputs to 
balance natural degradation. 
  We can also aggregate the payments for increments and liabilities for decrements into one 
up-front payment for a tillage plan. This up-front payment is the capitalized value of all of the 
payments and liabilities that occur throughout the plan. It is also the capitalized value of the 
total annual rental payments for the greenhouse gas-reducing services of the accumulated 
carbon stock. Up-front payments for the five tillage plans are shown in the last row of table 2. 
  All forms of payments are efficient under certainty with respect to a farmer’s actions and 
future tillage releases. Without certainty, incentive compatibility considerations favor rental 
payments or sale payments with liability. An up-front payment with no liability allowances 
would encourage moral hazard, but a combination of random tillage releases and risk aversion 
by farmers provides a trade-off between moral hazard avoidance and risk reduction. The 
industry or government purchaser of the offset, who has more opportunity to spread risk, can 
                                                 
6 For this case and for the rental case, it is possible to create a levelized payment for each cycle. This would give equal annual 
payments in steady state. Wilman Carbon  Sequestration in Agricultural Soils   133 
 
Table 2. Payments for Offsets 
 
Time 
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provide insurance for a farmer through an up-front payment for expected sequestration 
(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985). In addition, political constraints regarding payments may render 
liability payments unacceptable (Gulati and Vercammen, 2006). 
 
Sensitivity of the Tillage Rotation to Parameter Changes 
and Other Policy Options 
Paying farmers an offset price that reflects the true social value of sequestered carbon may be 
the best policy to internalize an externality in an otherwise competitive market. However, if 
this is not possible, or if there are other market failures (e.g., incomplete information, too high 
a degree of impatience), other policy recommendations can be extracted from a sensitivity 
analysis using the β functions. 
  As a base case, assume no offset value for sequestered carbon. Also assume all of the 
parameters of the β functions have the same values as in the simulations, giving 
12.9.
1( 1)
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rk
 

 
Varying parameters such as k, d, f, or ρ can change the position of λ, and/or the intercepts or 
slopes of the functions in table 1. In turn, the optimal tillage rotations are changed. As 
observed from table1, parameters that influence losses from weeds affect the vertical intercept 
of the β functions, parameters that influence the carbon stock affect their slope, and parameters 
that influence the shadow price of carbon cause a movement along the horizontal axis. Some 
parameters, such as the discount rate, exert multiple influences.   134   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
 A  lower  k value represents a slower SOC decay rate. Carbon inputs will stay in the soil 
longer and λ will increase. This will mean a movement to the right along the horizontal axis 
in figure 2, possibly into the t + 3 range, but the higher λ is tempered by the fact that F 
increases when k decreases. Tillage emissions increase because slowed natural decay leaves 
more carbon available for release by tillage (Andrén and Kätterer, 1997). The slopes of all the 
β functions will be decreased by this change. However, the slope change will be small if the 
terms containing F are small. With k = 0.02 (less than the k = 0.05 for the base case), the 
slopes of the β functions change only slightly, but the value of λ is increased to 20.6. The 
result is an increase in the optimal tillage rotation, in this case to t + 3 (figure 2).
7 
  Technologies or practices that reduce the negative impact of weed build-up and make d 
smaller will result in longer tillage rotations. A decrease in d brings the vertical intercepts of 
all β functions closer to zero, but does not change their slopes or the value of λ. This will tend 
to increase the tillage rotation. If the absolute value of d is reduced to zero, permanent no-till 
will generate the highest β value for all values of λ. 
  An increase in f means that a larger amount of carbon is released through continuous 
tillage. The amounts released when tillage is delayed will also increase, but if the terms fF, 
f(F + F
 2), and f(F + F
 2 + F
 3) are all small relative to f, the increase in slope will be greatest 
for the β functions representing longer tillage rotations. Thus, a longer tillage rotation will be 
optimal for a given λ value. Figure 3 shows this case when f is increased to 0.3 with the other 
parameters remaining at their original values. With λ remaining at λ = 12.9, the optimal tillage 
rotation increases to t + 2. 
  A decrease in the discount rate (an increase in ρ) will have three effects. First, the vertical 
intercepts of the β functions are pushed farther apart and tend to reduce the tillage rotation as 
weed costs increase. Second, the slope of the β functions will increase as future tillage losses 
are more heavily weighed. Third, 
1( 1)
PAc
k


 
increases. The latter two effects tend to increase tillage rotations. Although it is conceivable 
the first of the three effects could dominate and lead to a shorter tillage rotation, the parameter 
values that lead to the first effect dominating (small PcA, small f, and large PdA) would result 
in a short tillage rotation at the initial discount rate. Because the tillage rotation cannot be 
shorter than continuous tillage, the lower discount rate will simply mean no change from 
continuous tillage. Figure 4 shows the effect of a decrease in the discount rate to r = 0.01. 
Because the increase in shadow price of carbon dominates, λ increases to 16.8 and the optimal 
tillage rotation to t + 2. 
  What policy recommendations can be extracted from this sensitivity analysis? Investments 
in improved seeding technologies and better methods of weed control are possible ways to 
make d smaller and lengthen farmers’ tillage rotation.
8 A similar effect can be achieved by 
encouraging crop rotation. With continuous production of a single crop, weed populations 
adapt to become highly competitive with that crop. Crop rotations inhibit such adaptations 
(Murphy and Lemerle, 2006). None of these changes are costless, so policy incentives to 
undertake them may be necessary (Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao, 2006).   
                                                 
7 Because the slope changes are so small, figure 2 is used to show the change that results from varying k. 
8 Genetically modified crops are complementary to no-till practices for this reason (see Trayler, 2006). Wilman Carbon  Sequestration in Agricultural Soils   135 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Offer price (β) and tillage rotations: Higher f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Offer price (β) and tillage rotations: Smaller r 
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  Tillage rotations may be short for reasons other than weed control. If k is high and f low, 
there will be less to be gained by delaying tillage. In contrast, a low k and a high f indicate 
tillage is an important contributor to soil carbon loss, and there is more soil fertility gain from 
delaying tillage. Better knowledge of the magnitude of soil fertility gains resulting from 
delayed tillage could encourage farmers to till less frequently. 
  The discount rate weights future gains and losses relative to the present. The lower the 
discount rate, the greater is the weight given to the future. Given that the change in λ domin-
ates, lower borrowing costs could influence a farmer’s decision to undertake the slow process 
of building up soil fertility through longer tillage rotations. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper addresses incentives for permanence in soil carbon sequestration by modeling a 
farmer’s choice as one of tillage frequency rather than simply no-till adoption. Less frequent 
tillage builds up soil fertility, reduces atmospheric CO2, and allows the build-up of weeds. By 
allowing for a range of tillage choices, we show that higher offset payments for sequestered 
carbon reduce tillage frequency. It is also reduced by a higher rate of tillage emissions or 
reduced weed impact. When the discount rate, or the natural decay rate for carbon, varies, the 
net change depends on the magnitude of other parameters such as the rate of tillage emissions. 
These factors provide the basis for a range of supplementary policy mechanisms to influence 
tillage frequency. 
  The model is an initial investigation of farmers’ tillage choices that allows for occasional 
or regular tillage within a no-till regime. It incorporates concepts from forestry economics to 
model the tillage frequency choice. Because the instantaneous benefit function is linear, the 
benefit from a unit of weed stock reduction is fixed, as is the per unit cost of soil carbon 
reduction. As in many forestry models, nonlinearity is introduced through the functions that 
describe the growth of the weed stock and tillage emissions. Unlike tree growth, however, 
there is little documentation of the growth of weed stocks, nor is there strong evidence on 
how tillage emissions increase with postponed tillage. Future research would improve the 
realism and policy relevance of the model though more accurate estimates of these parameters 
and by allowing for nonlinearities in the benefit function. 
[Received June 2009; final revision received January 2011.] 
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Appendix: 
Dominance of t
 +
 4 or Permanent No-Till 
 
The assumption of no growth in the weed stock or tillage emissions losses beyond t
 +
 4 results in a β function 
for a longer tillage rotation that is a clockwise movement of the t
 +
 4 function around its intersection with the 
permanent no-till function. Thus, it approaches the permanent no-till function as the rotation length approaches 
infinity. Hence, either t
 +
 4 or permanent no-till always has at least as great a β value as any intermediate 
tillage rotations. 
 The  β functions for t
 +
 4 and permanent no-till are given by (A1) and (A2), respectively: 
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Setting the two β’s equal yields: 
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Solving for λ and simplifying yields: 
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Consider a longer rotation of t
 +
 5. The first-order condition for tillage in t
 +
 5 is the same as that for t
 +
 4 [see 
text equation (11)]. However, it has to be adjusted forward to t
 +
 5 rather than t
 +
 4. Substituting into text 
equation (12) yields the following β function: 
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Setting β from (A5) equal to β from (A2) yields: 
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Solving for λ and simplifying again yields (A4), and the β functions for t
 +
 4 and t
 +
 5 intersect the permanent 
no-till β function at the same level of λ.    □ 
 
 